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The Modern state of Iraq
Independence, 1932-39
The initial
institution and relevant laws since the establishment of the modern
state of Iraq (in arabic)
Since conflict among Iraq's political leaders
centered
essentially on how to end the mandate rather than on the right of
independence, King Faysal sought the cooperation of
opposition leaders after independence. Shortly after Iraq's admission to
the League, General Nuri, who had been prime minister
since 1930, resigned. After an interim administration, King Faysal
invited Rashid 'Ali al-Gaylani, one of the opposition
leaders, to form a new government. For a short while it seemed that all
the country's leaders would close ranks and devote all their efforts to
internal reforms.
But internal dissension soon developed. The first
incident was the Assyrian uprising of 1933. The
Assyrians, a small Christian community living in Mosul
province, were given assurances of security by both
Britain and Iraq. When the mandate was ended,
the Assyrians began to feel insecure and demanded new
assurances. Matters came to a head in the summer of 1933 when King
Faysal was in Europe. The opposition, now in
power, wanted to impress the public through a high-handed policy toward a
minority group. In clashes with the Iraqi troops, several hundred
Assyrians were brutally killed. The incident was brought to the
attention of the League of Nations less than a year after
Iraq had given assurances that it would protect minority rights. Had
King Faysal been in the country, he would have counseled
moderation. Upon his hasty return to Baghdad, he found
deep-seated divisions and a situation beyond his control. Suffering from
heart trouble, he returned to Switzerland, where he died
in September 1933. The Assyrian incident brought about
the fall of Rashid 'Ali and his replacement by a moderate
government.
Faysal
was succeeded by his son,
King Ghazi (1912-39), who was young and inexperienced--a
situation that gave political leaders an opportunity to compete for power.
Without political parties to channel their activities through
constitutional processes, politicians resorted to extra constitutional, or
violent, methods. One method was to embarrass those in power by
press attacks, palace intrigues, or incidents
that would cause Cabinet dissension and force the prime minister to
resign. The first five governmental changes after independence, from 1932
to 1934, were produced by these methods.
Another tactic was to incite tribal uprisings
in areas where there were tribal chiefs unfriendly to the group in power.
Tribes, though habitually opposed to authority, had been brought under
control and remained relatively quiet after 1932. When opposition leaders
began to incite them against the government in 1934, however, they
rebelled and caused the fall of three governments from 1934 to 1935.
A third method was military intervention.
The opposition tried to obtain the loyalty of army officers, plan a
coup d'état, and force those in power to resign. This
method, often resorted to by the opposition, proved to be the most
dangerous, because once the army intervened in politics it became
increasingly difficult to reestablish civilian rule. From 1936 until 1941,
when it was defeated in a war with Britain, the army dominated domestic
politics. The army again intervened in 1958, and it continues to dominate
the political scene.
Two different sets of opposition leaders produced the
first military coup d'état in 1936. The first group, led by Hikmat
Sulayman, was a faction of old politicians who sought power by
violent methods. The other was the Ahali group, composed
mainly of young men who advocated socialism and
democracy and sought to carry out reform
programs. It was Hikmat Sulayman, however, who urged
General Bakr Sidqi, commander of an army division, to
stage a surprise attack on Baghdad in cooperation with
another military commander and forced the Cabinet to resign. Apparently
King Ghazi was also disenchanted with the group in power
and so allowed the government to resign. Hikmat Sulayman
became prime minister in October 1936, and Bakr Sidqi was
appointed chief of the general staff. Neither the Ahali
group nor Hikmat Sulayman could improve social
conditions, however, because the army gradually dominated the political
scene. Supported by opposition leaders, a dissident military faction
assassinated Bakr Sidqi, but civilian rule was not
reestablished. This first military coup introduced a new factor in
politics. Lack of leadership after the assassination of Bakr Sidqi
left the army divided, while jealousy among leading army officers induced
each faction to support a different set of civilian leaders. The army
became virtually the deciding factor in Cabinet changes from 1936 to 1941.
Despite political instability, material progress
continued during King Ghazi's short reign. The
Kut al-'Amarah irrigation project, begun in 1934, was completed,
and other projects, to be financed by oil royalties, were planned. The
pipelines from the Kirkuk oil fields to
the Mediterranean were opened in 1935. The
railroads, still under British control, were
purchased in 1935, and the Ba'iji-Tal Küçük section, the
only missing railway link between the Persian
Gulf and Europe, was completed in 1938. There
was also a noticeable increase in construction,
foreign trade, and educational facilities.
Several disputes with neighboring countries were settled, including the
dispute with Iran over the Shatt al-'Arab
and the dispute over the boundary with Syria, which was
settled in Iraq's favour; Iraq thereafter possessed the
Jabal Sinjar. A nonaggression pact, called the
Sa'dabad Pact, between Turkey, Iran,
Afghanistan, and Iraq was signed in
1937. In 1939, shortly before the outbreak of World War II,
King Ghazi was killed in a mysterious
car accident, and his son Faysal II ascended the throne.
As Faysal was only four years old, his uncle, Emir
'Abd al-Ilah, was appointed regent and
served in this capacity for the next 14 years.
World War II and British intervention, 1939-45
General Nuri, author of the 1930
treaty, was prime minister when World War II broke out.
Believing that the Anglo-Iraqi alliance was the best
guarantee for Iraqi security, he wanted to declare war on
Germany, but his ministers counseled caution, as
British victory was then in doubt. General Nuri
accordingly declared Iraq nonbelligerent and severed
diplomatic relations with Germany. When Italy
entered the war, however, Nuri, then minister of foreign
affairs in Rashid 'Ali al-Gaylani's Cabinet, was unable
to persuade the Cabinet to break off diplomatic relations with
Italy. Under the influence of Pan-Arab leaders,
public opinion in Iraq changed radically after
France's fall, becoming especially hostile to Britain
because other Arab countries remained under foreign
control. Pan-Arabs urged Iraqi leaders
to free Syria and Palestine and achieve
unity among Arab countries. Extremists advocated alliance
with Germany as the country that would foster
independence and unity among Arabs.
Rashid 'Ali was at first unwilling to
side with the extremists and gave lip service to the Anglo-Iraqi
alliance. Dissension among the Iraqi leaders, however,
forced him to side with the Pan-Arabs. Leading army
officers also fell under Pan-Arab influences and
encouraged Rashid 'Ali to detach Iraq from the
British alliance. During 1940 and 1941, Iraqi
officers were unwilling to cooperate with Britain, and
the Pan-Arab leaders began secret negotiations with the
Axis Powers. Britain decided to send
reinforcements to Iraq. Rashid 'Ali,
while allowing the landing of a small British force in
1940, was forced to resign early in 1941, but he was reinstated by the
army in April and refused further British requests for
reinforcements. British contingents entered Iraq
from the Persian Gulf and from the Habbaniyah
air base in April and May 1941; armed conflict with Iraqi
forces followed. The hostilities lasted only 30 days, during which period
a few Iraqi leaders, including the regent
and General Nuri, fled the country. By the end of May the
Iraqi army capitulated. Rashid 'Ali and
his Pan-Arab supporters left the country.
The return of the regent and moderate
leaders through British intervention had far-reaching
consequences. Britain was given what it demanded: the use
of transportation and communication facilities and a declaration of war on
the Axis Powers in January 1942. Rashid 'Ali's
supporters were dismissed from the service, and some were interned for the
duration of the war. Four officers who were responsible for the war were
hanged.
Postwar reconstruction and social upheavals, 1945-58
During World War II, liberal and
moderate Iraqi elements began to play an active political
role. The entry of the United States and the
Soviet Union into the war and their declarations in favor of
democratic freedoms greatly enhanced the position of the
Iraqi democratic elements. The people endured shortages
and regulations restricting personal liberty and the freedom of the press,
trusting that the end of the war would bring the promised better way of
life. The government, however, paid no attention to the new spirit, and
the wartime regulations and restrictions continued after the war. The
regent called a meeting of the country's leaders in 1945
and made a speech in which he attributed public disaffection to the
absence of a truly parliamentary system. He called for
the formation of political parties and promised full
freedom for their activities and the launching of social and economic
reforms.
The immediate reactions to the regent's
speech were favorable, but, when political parties were formed in 1946
and certain regulations abolished, the older politicians and vested
interests resisted. The new government formed in January 1946 was
overthrown within a few months of its inception. General Nuri
then became prime minister and tried to enlist the cooperation of
political parties, but the general elections held under
his government's supervision were no different from previous controlled
elections. The parties boycotted the elections. General Nuri
resigned in March 1947, and Salih Jabr formed a new
government.
Jabr, the first Shi'ite
politician to become a prime minister, included in his Cabinet a number of
young men, but he himself was unacceptable to some liberal and nationalist
elements who had been roughly handled when he was wartime minister of
interior. Jabr tried to help the Arabs
in Palestine in order to improve his image in nationalist
circles, but he mishandled opposition leaders. Most damaging was his
attempt to replace the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1930 without
consulting with Iraqi leaders. When his attention was
called to the need for consultation, he called in only older politicians
and excluded the younger leaders.
Jabr entered into negotiations with
Britain with the intention of enhancing his own position. When he
found that Britain wanted to retain control of its air
bases in Iraq, he insisted that Britain
accept the principle of Iraqi control of the bases;
Iraq would allow Britain to use them in
the event of war. He threatened to resign if Britain
refused his proposals.
It was with this understanding that Jabr
proceeded to London early in 1948 to negotiate a new
treaty. He and Ernest Bevin, the British foreign
secretary, quickly came to an agreement and signed a 20-year
treaty at Portsmouth on Jan. 15, 1948. It provided for a
new alliance between Iraq and
Britain on the basis of equality and
complete independence and stated that :-
"each of the high
contracting parties undertake not to adopt in foreign countries an
attitude which is inconsistent with the alliance or which might create
difficulties for the other party."
An improvement of the 1930 treaty, this treaty sought
an alliance on the basis of mutual interests. The two air bases, which
were often the subject of criticism, were returned to Iraq.
British forces were to be evacuated, and Iraq
would be supplied with arms and military training. The annex to the treaty
stressed the importance of the air bases as "an essential element in
the defense of Iraq." Britain's use
of the bases in the event of war, or threat of war, would be dependent on
Iraq's invitation. The treaty also provided for the establishment of a
joint defense board for common defense and consultation. Both parties
agreed to grant each other necessary facilities for defense purposes.
Despite these advances, the treaty was repudiated
immediately in a popular uprising. Street demonstrations
had occurred before the treaty was signed, in defense of Arab
rights in Palestine, but, when the news of the signing of
the new treaty was broadcast in London, rioting and
demonstrations in Baghdad followed. The regent
called a meeting at the royal household on January 21 that was attended by
both older and younger leaders. After deliberations, they decided to
repudiate the treaty. Jabr returned to Baghdad
to defend his position but to no avail. Rioting and demonstrations
increased, and Jabr was forced to resign.
The new treaty was not the root cause of the uprising.
It was the culmination of a struggle between the young, liberal leaders
who wanted to participate in political activities and the older leaders
who insisted on excluding them. This conflict continued after the treaty
was rejected. The older politicians returned to power under General
Nuri's leadership.
In 1952 another popular uprising,
stirred by opposition leaders and carried out by students and extremists,
occurred. The police were unable to control the mob, and the
regent called on the army to maintain public
order. The chief of the general staff governed the country under
martial law for more than two months. Civilian
rule was restored at the beginning of 1953, but there was no sign that the
country's older leaders were prepared to share authority with their
opponents.
Meanwhile, King Faysal II, who had
come of age, began to exercise his formal powers, and the period of
regency came to an end. It was hoped that the regent
would withdraw from active politics and allow the political forces of the
country to create a new order. The former regent, who
became the crown prince, continued to control political
events from behind the scenes. The struggle for power among the leaders
continued with increasing intensity until the downfall of the
monarchy in 1958.
Despite political instability, Iraq
achieved material progress during the 1950s, thanks to a new oil
agreement that increased royalties and the establishment of the
Development Board. The oil agreement between the Iraqi
government and the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC),
originally signed in 1925, had yielded relatively modest royalties, owing
to certain technical limitations, such as the need for pipelines,
and to war conditions. It was not until 1952 that construction of
pipelines to Banias was completed.
Some points of dispute between the Iraqi
government and the IPC were not entirely
resolved. The nationalization of the oil industry in
Iran and the announcement of the 1950 agreement between
Saudi Arabia and ARAMCO (Arabian American Oil
Company), on a half-and-half basis of payment, induced the Iraqi
government and the IPC to negotiate a new agreement on
the division of profits. Some opposition leaders demanded the
nationalization of the oil industry, but the Iraqi
government and the IPC, forestalling any serious move for
nationalization, agreed to negotiate on the basis of the
fifty-fifty formula, to the mutual advantage of
Iraq and the company. The new agreement was
signed in 1952, allowing Iraq to take part of its share
of the profits in kind and to receive an increasing amount of royalties
specifically agreed upon between the two parties. It was stated that Iraq
would receive no less than £330 million in 1953 and 1954 and no less than
£350 million in 1955 and subsequent years.
In 1950 the government created an independent
Development Board, an agency immune from political pressures and
responsible directly to the prime minister. The board had
six executive members, three of whom had to be experts in some branch of
the development program. The prime minister, as chairman, and the minister
of finance were ex-officio members. An amendment to the law increased
membership by two and provided for a minister of development responsible
directly to the head of the Cabinet. These members were appointed by the
Cabinet, had equal voting rights, and were not permitted to hold any other
official position. Two foreign members held positions as
experts, and the Iraqi members were
selected on merit and past experience. The board was composed of a
council and ministry. Its staff was divided into
technical sections and the ministry into a number of departments. The
technical sections were for irrigation, flood
control, water storage, drainage,
transportation, and industrial and
agricultural development. The board was financed from 70
percent of oil royalties and from loans and revenues from the board's own
projects. The estimated expenditure of the first six-year program
(1951-56) was £3155 million, and in 1950 the World Bank provided a loan of
$12.8 million for the Wadi Ath-Tharthar flood-control
project.
The Tharthar project, completed in
1956, connected the Tigris River at Samarra'
(some 60 miles north of Baghdad) with the Wadi
Ath-Tharthar Depression. A barrage was constructed on the
Euphrates at Ramadi, making it possible to
divert water into Lake Habbaniyah. Other flood-control
plans, such as that at Bekme (completed after the
revolution of 1958), were laid down. Extensive work on bridges and public
buildings, including schools, hospitals,
a new Parliament building, and a royal house,
was started.
This work, especially the work on dams and irrigation
projects, was a long-term investment, and many short-term projects of more
direct benefit to the population were neglected. Opposition leaders
attacked the Development Board for the stress on
long-term projects that they claimed benefited only the vested
interests--landowners and tribal chiefs. Despite criticism, the board
maintained an independent status rarely enjoyed by any other government
department. Nevertheless, the public remained unaware of the far-reaching
effects of the projects undertaken, while the opposition attacked the
board for squandering funds on contracts given to wealthy landlords and
influential politicians.
The revolution and first republic 1958
Despite material progress, the monarchy
failed to win public support and, in particular, the confidence of the
younger generation. Before the revolution, Iraq lacked an enlightened
leadership capable of achieving progress and inspiring public confidence.
The new generation offered such leadership, but the older leaders resisted
and embarked on an unpopular foreign policy, including an alliance with
Britain through participation in the Baghdad Pact
and opposition to the establishment of the United Arab Republic
(U.A.R.).
The failure of younger civilians to obtain power
aroused the concern of some young military officers who, required by
military discipline to take no part in politics, called themselves the
Free Officers and began to organize in small groups and
to lay down revolutionary plans. The number of Free Officers
was relatively small, but there was a considerably larger number of
sympathizers. The officers worked in cells, and the identity of the
participants was kept secret. Only the Central Organization, which
supplied leadership of the movement, was known to all the Free
Officers. The Central Organization was composed of 14 officers,
headed by 'Abd al-Karim Qasim, who held the highest
military rank.
Of the several plots proposed, that laid down by
Qasim and his close collaborator 'Abd as-Salam 'Arif
proved the most appropriate. The general staff issued an order to one of
the brigades, in which 'Arif served, to proceed to
Jordan on July 14, 1958, to reinforce Jordanian
forces against threats by Israel. Brigadier Qasim,
in command of another brigade, was to protect the brigades going to
Jordan. He and 'Arif agreed that as the
brigade proceeding to Jordan passed through
Baghdad it would capture the city.
On July 14 the revolutionary forces captured the
capital, declared the downfall of the monarchy, and
proclaimed a republic. The leading members of the
royal house, including the king and
crown prince, were executed. General Nuri was
killed during the disturbances. Qasim, head of the
revolutionary force, formed a Cabinet, over which he presided, and
appointed himself commander of the National Forces. He also assumed the
portfolio of defense and appointed 'Arif minister of the
interior and deputy commander of the National Forces. A Council of
Sovereignty, composed of three persons, was to act as head of
state.
A provisional constitution declared
that Iraq formed an integral part "of the Arab
nation" and that "Arabs and Kurds
are considered partners in this homeland." Iraq was
declared a republic and Islam the
religion of the state; all executive and
legislative powers were entrusted to the Sovereignty
Council and the Cabinet. It soon became clear,
however, that power rested in Qasim's hands, supported by
the army.
Conflicts among the officers developed, first between
Qasim and 'Arif and then between
Qasim and his supporters. 'Arif championed the
Pan-Arab cause and advocated Iraq's
union with the U.A.R. Qasim rallied the
forces against Arab unity--Kurds, communists,
and others--and stressed Iraq's own identity
and internal unity. 'Arif was dropped
from power in October, but in 1959 Qasim's power was
threatened by other factions. He tried to divert public attention to
foreign affairs by advancing Iraq's claim to
Kuwait's sovereignty in June 1961. This brought him into conflict
not only with Britain and Kuwait but
also with the other Arab countries. He opened negotiations with the
Iraq Petroleum Company to increase Iraq's
royalties, but his extreme demands resulted in the breakdown of
negotiations in 1961. Public Law 80 was enacted to
prohibit the granting of concessions to any foreign company and to
transfer control over all matters connected with oil to
an Iraq National Oil Company (INOC).
By 1963 Qasim had become isolated
internally as well as externally; the only great power with which he
remained friendly was the Soviet Union. When one faction
of the army, in cooperation with one Arab nationalist
group--the Iraqi regional branch of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath
("Revivalist" or "Renaissance") Party--started a rebellion in February
1963, the regime suddenly collapsed, and Qasim was
executed.
The military coup of 1963
The military faction that brought about the collapse of
the first Republic preferred to remain behind the scenes
rather than assume direct responsibility. The Ba'ath Party,
a group of young activists who advocated Arab nationalism
and socialism, was entrusted with power. Ba'th
leaders invited 'Abd as-Salam 'Arif to assume the
presidency. A National Council for Revolutionary Command
(NCRC), composed of civilian and
military leaders, was established to assume legislative
and executive powers. The premiership
was entrusted to Colonel Ahmad Hassan al- Bakr, a
Ba'thist officer.
Some of the Ba'ath leaders wanted to
carry out Ba'ath socialist ideas; others advised more
caution. A compromise was finally reached in which the party's goals--Arab
unity, freedom, and socialism--were
reaffirmed in principle, but it was decided to adopt a transitional
program. Industrialization and economic
development were stressed, and the role of the middle class was
recognized. The dissension among Ba'ath leaders, however,
soon led to the collapse of the regime. President 'Arif,
whose powers initially had been restricted by the Ba'ath
leaders, rallied the military forces to his side. On Nov. 18, 1963, he
placed the leaders of the Ba'ath Party under arrest and
took over control, becoming in fact, as in name, the real ruler of the
country. In May 1964, a new provisional constitution was
promulgated in which the principles of Arab unity and
socialism were adopted, and in July the banks
and a number of the country's industries were
nationalized.
The idea of Arab socialism attracted
only a small group in Iraq, and 'Arif
began to discover its unfavourable effects on the country. 'Arif
himself had never been a believer in socialism, but he
had adopted it under the influence of Egypt. The adverse
influence of nationalization gave him an excuse to
replace the group that supported socialism with others
who would pay attention to the reality of Iraq's economic
conditions. Nor had 'Arif been happy with the group of
officers who had elevated him to power. He began to prepare the way to
entrust power to civilian hands willing to be guided by him as chief
executive.
In September 1965 'Arif invited
'Abd ar-Rahman al-Bazzaz, a distinguished lawyer,
diplomat, and writer on Arab nationalism, to form a new
government. Al-Bazzaz did not feel that he should abolish
Arab socialism, but he offered to increase
production and create a balance between the public
and private sectors.
'Arif died suddenly in a
helicopter accident in April 1966. Even before his death, Premier
al-Bazzaz, known for his opposition to military
interference in politics, had begun to talk about the need to hold
elections for a representative assembly. Military
officers pressured the new president, 'Abd ar-Rahman 'Arif,
elder brother of the late president, to remove al-Bazzaz,
and the Cabinet resigned in August 1966. Power remained in military hands,
but factionalism in the army was accentuated and leadership frequently
changed. The Arab defeat in the Arab-Israeli
War of 1967, in which Iraq took only a nominal role, led
to intense unrest within the country and within the party. The
Ba'ath, joined by other opposition leaders, called for the
formation of a coalition government and the holding of general elections
for a National Assembly. President 'Arif
paid no attention to their demands.
The Military Coup of 1968
After 'Arif took control in 1963, the
Ba'ath Party was forced underground and began to make
sweeping changes in its leadership and strategy in order to recapture
power. Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr became secretary of the
Regional Command of the Ba'ath Party in
1964. He was assisted in reorganizing the party by Saddam Hussein,
who had participated in the attempt on Qasim's life in
1959. Saddam Hussein proved instrumental in rallying
civilian Ba'thist support for al-Bakr. A
premature attempt to seize power in September 1964 led to the imprisonment
of the principal Ba'ath leaders, including al-Bakr
and Saddam Hussein. In 1965 al-Bakr was
released because of illness, and in 1966 Saddam Hussein
escaped.
On July 17, 1968, the government was overthrown by the
army. The reasons given by Ba'ath--the
corruption of the 'Arif regime, Kurdish
disturbances in the north, the government's failure to support
other Arab countries in the Six-Day War of 1967--were
only circumstantial. The root cause was that the 'Arif
regime, because it had not held popular elections, had failed to attain
legitimacy and had become completely dependent on military support. Thus,
when the Ba'ath Party persuaded a few officers in key
positions to abandon the regime, the fate of the 'Arif
government was sealed.
Four officers agreed to cooperate with the
Ba'ath Party. These were Colonel 'Abd ar-Razzaq an-Nayif,
head of military intelligence, Colonel Ibrahim 'Abd
ar-Rahman ad-Da'ud, chief of the Republican Guard,
Colonel Sa'dun Ghaydan Colonel Hammad Shihab.
The first two agreed to cooperate on condition that an-Nayif
would be the new premier and ad-Da'ud
the minister of defense. The Ba'ath Party
accepted this arrangement as a means to achieve power but intended to
bridle them at the earliest possible moment, having little confidence in
their loyalty.
On the morning of July 17, 1968, President 'Arif's
palace was stormed by Ba'thist officers led by
al-Bakr; Colonel Ghaydan had opened the gate for
them. 'Arif was awakened and informed that the army had
revolted. He immediately surrendered and agreed to leave the country. He
went to London and then to Istanbul,
where he lived in retirement. Almost 20 years later he returned to live in
Baghdad. The first act of the new regime was to establish
the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), which assumed
supreme authority. The RCC elected al-Bakr
president of the republic, and he invited an-Nayif to
form a Cabinet. Al-Bakr was not interested in
administrative details, and as he grew older and his health deteriorated
he began to depend more heavily on Saddam Hussein to
carry out the business of government.
Almost immediately a struggle for power arose between
the Ba'ath and Nayif-Da'ud group,
ostensibly over socialism and foreign policy
but in fact over which of the two groups was to control
the regime. On July 30, 1968, an-Nayif was invited to
lunch at the presidential palace. After the meal, Saddam Hussein
entered with a group of armed officers and told an-Nayif
he was under arrest. It was agreed that an-Nayif's life
would be spared if he left the country, and he was sent to Morocco
as ambassador. Ad-Da'ud, who was then on a mission to
Jordan, was instructed to remain there.
This bloodless coup, which did not cause any
disturbances in Iraq, cleared the way for the
Ba'ath Party to control the regime. Al-Bakr
assumed the premiership in addition to the presidency. Most Cabinet posts
were given to Ba'th leaders. Sympathizers of the
Nayif-Da'ud group were removed, and a number of civil servants
considered unfriendly to the regime were retired or relieved of duty.
The Interim Constitution was issued on
Sept. 21, 1968. It provided for an essentially presidential system
composed of the RCC, Cabinet, and
National Assembly. Until the National Assembly
was called, the RCC exercised both executive
and legislative powers. The Ba'ath Party,
already highly organized, began to infiltrate and influence almost
all national organizations.
Disturbances in the Kurdish area and
several attempts to overthrow the regime kept the Ba'ath
leaders preoccupied and prevented them from launching planned
social and economic programs. The attempts to
overthrow the regime were suppressed without difficulty, but the
Kurdish problem proved more complicated.
Even before the Ba'ath Party achieved
power, the Kurdish question had been discussed in several
meetings of the Ba'ath National and
Regional Commands. However, in late 1968, fighting
between the Kurds and the Iraqi army
began once again and escalated to full-scale war. With military aid
provided by Iran, the Kurds were able to
pose a serious threat to the Ba'ath regime. By early 1970,
negotiations between the Ba'ath leaders, the
Kurdish leader Mulla Mustafa al-Barzani, and the
leaders of the Kurdish Democratic Party were under way.
The government agreed to officially recognize the Kurds
as a "national" group entitled to a form of autonomous status called
self-rule. This would eventually lead to the
establishment of a provincial administrative council and
an assembly to deal with Kurdish
affairs. This was proclaimed in the Manifesto of March 11,
1970, to come into effect in 1974, following a census to determine the
frontiers of the area in which the Kurds formed the
majority of the population.
On April 9, 1972, Iraq and the
Soviet Union signed a treaty of friendship. The
two countries agreed to cooperate in political,
economic, and military affairs. The
Soviet Union also agreed to supply Iraq with
arms.
To strengthen the Ba'ath regime, two
important steps were taken: the conflict with the Iraqi Communist
Party (ICP), which had arisen after the revolution of
1958, was reconciled; and the National Progressive Front
was established to provide legitimacy to the regime by enlisting the
support of other political parties. Since the March Manifesto
had established a basis for settlement of the Kurdish problem,
Kurdish political parties were willing to participate in
the National Progressive Front. The ICP
had also shown interest. A Charter for National Action,
prepared by the Ba'th Party, was published in the press
for public discussion. It became the basis for cooperation with the
ICP and other parties.
In March 1972, Ba'athist and
ICP leaders met to discuss the content of the charter and express
their views about basic principles such as socialism,
democracy, and economic development. A
statute was drawn up expressing the principles agreed upon as the basis
for cooperation among the parties of the front. It also provided for a
16-member central executive committee, called the High Committee,
and a secretariat. The front officially came into
existence in 1973.
In 1973-74, negotiations with al-Barzani
and the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) to implement the
March Manifesto failed. The census promised in the
March Manifesto had not been taken, and al-Barzani
and the KDP refused to accept the Ba'thist
determination of the borders of the Kurdish area, which
excluded the oil-rich Kirkuk province. Nevertheless, on
March 11, 1974, the Ba'ath regime proceeded to implement
its own plan for self-rule, establishing a
provincial council and an assembly in
cooperation with Kurdish leaders who were opposed to
al-Barzani's militant approach.
The Kurdish war started in March 1974.
Al-Barzani's decision to go to war with the Ba'ath
government seems to have been made with the support of the shah of
Iran, who sought to pressure Iraq to alter the
water frontier in the Shatt al-'Arab to the
thalweg, or median line of the river. (Under the terms of the
1937 treaty, the boundary was set at the low-water mark on the Iranian
side, giving Iraq control of the shipping channel.) The shah
stopped his assistance to al-Barzani when the
Ba'ath regime agreed to negotiate with him about the Shatt
al-'Arab boundary.
The shah and Saddam Hussein
met in Algiers in March 1975, and they came to an
agreement quickly. Saddam Hussein agreed that the
thalweg would be the boundary in the Shatt al-'Arab,
and the shah promised to stop his assistance to the
Kurds. On the basis of the Algiers Agreement,
the foreign ministers of Iraq and Iran
met in Baghdad on June 13, 1975, and signed an elaborate
treaty embodying the settlement of all disputes relating to frontiers
between the two countries. This agreement virtually ended the
Kurdish war.
Relations between the Ba'ath regime and
the ICP deteriorated after 1975. Ba'ath
policies were openly criticized in the communist press.
Many communists were arrested, and by 1979 most of the
principal ICP leaders had left Iraq. The
absence of communist representation deprived the front of
an opposition party that often voiced dissent on fundamental issues.
Iraq's other opposition parties also were forced
underground.
Economic development to 1980
Perhaps the greatest assets of the Ba'ath
regime were the ambitious plans for reconstruction and development laid
down by its leaders. The struggle for power during
1958-68 had left little time for constructive work, and the Ba'ath
Party sought not only to transform the economic system from free
enterprise to collectivism but also to assert
the country's economic independence. The immediate
objectives were to increase production and to raise the
standard of living, but the ultimate objective was to
establish a socialist society in which all citizens would
enjoy the benefits of progress and prosperity.
The five-year economic plans of 1965-70 and 1971-75
concentrated on raising the level of production in both
agriculture and industry and aimed at
reducing dependence on oil revenues as the primary source
for development. But agriculture lagged far behind
target, and industrial development was slow. In the third
five-year plan (1976-80), greater emphasis on agricultural
production was noticeable, and industrial
production slowed.
The nationalization of the oil industry
was considered by the Ba'ath leaders to be their
greatest achievement. Between 1969 and 1972 several agreements with
foreign powers--the Soviet Union and others--were
concluded to provide the Iraq National Oil Company (INOC)
with the capital and technical skills to
exploit the oil fields. In 1972 the operation of the North
Rumaylah field, rich in oil, started, and an Iraqi Oil
Tankers Company was established to deliver oil to several foreign
countries. Also in 1972 the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC)
was nationalized (with compensation), and a national company, the
Iraqi Company for Oil Operations, was established to operate the
fields. In 1973, when the fourth Arab-Israeli War broke
out, Iraq nationalized U.S. and
Dutch companies, and in 1975 it nationalized the remaining
foreign interests in the Basra Petroleum Company.
The initial step in agrarian reform
had been taken with the Agrarian Reform Law of 1958,
which provided for the distribution to peasants of lands in excess of a
certain maximum ownership. A decade later, less than half of the land had
been distributed. In 1969 a revised Agrarian Reform Law
relieved the peasants from payments for their land by abolishing
compensation to landowners, and a year later a new Agrarian Reform
Law was designed to improve the conditions of the peasantry,
increase agricultural production, and correlate development in
rural and urban areas. The results were
disappointing, however, because of the difficulty of persuading
the peasants to stay on their farms and their inability to improve the
quality of agricultural production.
The Ba'ath regime also completed work
on irrigation projects that had already been under way
and began new projects in areas where water was likely to be scarce in the
summer. In the five-year plan of 1976-80, funds were allocated to complete
dams on the Euphrates, Tigris,
Diyala, and Upper Zab rivers and the lake known
as al-Tharthar (in northern Iraq). Recognizing that a
rapid transition to full socialism was neither possible
nor in the country's best interest, the Ba'ath provided
for a private, though relatively small, sector for private investors, and
a third, mixed sector was created in which private and public enterprises
could cooperate.
Iraq under Saddam Hussein
It was virtually taken for granted that, when
al-Bakr relinquished the presidency, Saddam Hussein
would succeed him. Nevertheless, his succession was not carried out
without complications. Perhaps the two most important complicating factors
were Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat's
decision to make peace with Israel and Syrian
President Hafiz al-Assad's bid for economic
and political union with Iraq.
These two events were not unrelated. Arab unity
had been a long-standing goal of the Ba'ath Party in both
Syria and Iraq, but Assad
was prompted to call for union with Iraq
only after Egypt's rapprochement with Israel
in 1977.
The initial negotiations were very promising. Talks in
October 1978 led to the signing of a "charter for joint national
action," declaring the two countries intent to establish
military unity. By 1979 it was clear that the eventual aim was
full political union. Al-Bakr and
Assad also cooperated with other Arab
leaders in taking a firm stand against Sadat. By March
1979, however, when Sadat signed a peace treaty with
Israel, negotiations for a Syro-Iraqi
union had slowed. The main stumbling block was the question of whether the
leadership of the unified state would be primarily Syrian
or Iraqi. Relations between the two countries
deteriorated.
On July 16, 1979, the eve of the anniversary of the
revolution of 1968, al-Bakr officially announced his
resignation. He was immediately succeeded by Saddam Hussein.
On July 28 it was announced that a plot to overthrow the government had
been uncovered. This announcement had been preceded, on July 12, by the
arrest of Muhyi 'Abd al-Hussein al-Mashhadi, the
secretary of the RCC. Mashhadi made a
public confession, stating that he and other Ba'ath
leaders, including four other members of the RCC, had
conspired to overthrow the regime. The Syrian government
was alleged to have provided the funds for their activities. A special
court was set up, and 22 conspirators were executed; a number of others
were sentenced to prison terms. This development put an end to plans for
union with Syria.
The Iran-Iraq War
Relations with Iran grew increasingly
strained after the shah was overthrown in 1979.
Iraq recognized Iran's new Shi'ite
Islamic government, but the Iranian leaders
would have nothing to do with the Ba'ath regime, which
they denounced as secular. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini,
the spiritual leader of the Iranian revolution,
proclaimed his policy of "exporting the revolution," and
Iraq was high on the list of countries whose governments
were to be overthrown and replaced by a replica of the Islamic regime in
Iran. In addition, Iran still occupied
three small pieces of territory along the Iran-Iraq
border that were supposed to be returned to Iraq under
the treaty of 1975.
In 1979 and 1980, border clashes occurred frequently.
Saddam Hussein announced on Sept. 17, 1980, that he was
abrogating the 1975 agreements because they had been
violated by Iran. On Sept. 21-22, 1980, Iraqi
forces invaded Iran; at the same time, Iraq
bombed Iranian air bases and other strategic targets. On
September 28 the UN Security Council called for a
cease-fire and appealed to Iran and Iraq
to "settle their dispute by peaceful means." Saddam Hussein
replied, saying that Iraq would accept a cease-fire provided
Iran also did so. Iran's response,
however, was negative. Further attempts at mediation in 1980 and 1981 also
were rejected by Iran. The war thus continued and in
succeeding years was extended to the gulf area, leading to foreign
intervention. It has been aptly called the Gulf War.
The Iraqi advance into Iran
was stopped in November 1980. There followed a stalemate that continued
until September 1981, when Iran began a series of
successful offensives. By May 1982 the Iraqis had been driven from most of
the captured territory. Iranian forces began to penetrate
into Basra province. During 1983-86 they occupied
Majnun Island, threatened the city of Basra, and
occupied the Fao peninsula. In the northeastern
provinces Iranian forces, in cooperation with
Iraqi Kurds, threatened the area from Kirkuk to
the Turkish border and penetrated to the towns of
Hajj 'Umran and Halabjah. They met with stiff
resistance in the north, however. Using chemical weapons, Iraqi
forces inflicted heavy casualties on the Kurds. The
Iranian attacks on Basra were repulsed
with heavy casualties on both sides. Iraq countered in
the so-called tanker war by bombing Iranian
oil terminals in the gulf, especially on Kharg
Island. Iran's occupation of Majnun
Island and the Fao peninsula and its threats to
Basra continued to be of great concern to Iraq.
In 1987 the military equation began to
favor
Iraq. Iraq obtained additional arms from
France and the Soviet Union, which considerably
improved its military position, and it improved relations with several
Western countries, notably the United States;
diplomatic relations with the United States had resumed
in 1984. In 1987 the United States agreed to re flag 11
Kuwaiti tankers and escort them in international waters
through the Strait of Hormuz. Britain
and France also escorted tankers carrying their own
flags. Despite the incident of the Stark,
a U.S. destroyer that was inadvertently attacked by an
Iraqi bomber on May 17, 1987, the United States
supported Iraq, both diplomatically at the United
Nations and militarily by providing information
about Iranian military movements in the gulf area.
In October 1987 and April 1988 U.S. forces attacked
Iranian ships and oil platforms.
On July 20, 1987, the UN Security Council
unanimously passed Resolution 598, urging
Iraq and Iran to accept a cease-fire,
withdraw their forces to internationally recognized boundaries, and settle
their frontier disputes by negotiations held under the auspices of the
United Nations. Iraq agreed to abide by
the terms of the resolution if Iran would also do so.
Iran, however, neither accepted nor rejected the
resolution but demanded amendments condemning Iraq as the
aggressor in the war and calling on all foreign navies to leave the gulf.
Military operations in the gulf resumed, and Iraq
recaptured the Fao peninsula and the districts of
Salamcha and Majnun. It became clear that
Iran's military position in the gulf had become
untenable. Fearing an internal uprising, Iranian leaders
impressed on Khomeini the necessity of accepting the
cease-fire in order to save the regime from collapse. Iran
formally declared its acceptance of Resolution 598 on
Aug. 20, 1988.
When the foreign ministers of Iraq and
Iran met for the first time in Geneva in
August 1988 and later in 1989, there was no progress on how
Resolution 598 was to be implemented. Iraq
demanded the full exchange of prisoners as the first step, while
Iran insisted that withdrawal of Iraqi forces
from Iran should precede the exchange of prisoners. It
was not until 1990 that both Iraq and Iran
finally agreed to settle their differences on the basis of the 1975
agreement and carry out the terms of UN Resolution 598.
Persian Gulf War and
Aftermath
In 1990 Iraq revived a long-standing territorial
dispute with Kuwait, its ally during the war with Iran, claiming that
overproduction of petroleum by Kuwait was injuring Iraq’s economy by
depressing the price of crude oil. Iraqi troops invaded Kuwait on August 2
and rapidly took over the country. The UN Security Council issued a series
of resolutions that condemned the occupation, imposed a broad trade
embargo on Iraq, and demanded that Iraq withdraw unconditionally by
January 15, 1991.
When Iraq failed to comply, a coalition led by the
United States began intensive aerial bombardment of military and
infrastructural targets in Iraq and Kuwait in January 1991. The ensuing
Persian Gulf War proved disastrous for Iraq, which was forced out of
Kuwait in about six weeks. Coalition forces invaded southern Iraq, and
tens of thousands of Iraqis were killed. Many of the country’s armored
vehicles and artillery pieces were destroyed, and its nuclear and chemical
weapons facilities were severely damaged. In April, Iraq agreed to UN
terms for a permanent ceasefire; coalition troops withdrew from southern
Iraq as a UN peacekeeping force moved in to police the Iraq-Kuwait border.
Meanwhile, Hussein used his remaining military forces to suppress
rebellions by Shias in the south and Kurds in the north. Hundreds of
thousands of Kurdish refugees fled to Turkey and Iran, and U.S., British,
and French troops landed inside Iraq’s northern border to establish a
Kurdish enclave with refugee camps to protect another 600,000 Kurds from
Iraqi government reprisals. In addition, international forces set up
“no-fly zones” in both northern and southern Iraq to ensure the safety of
the Kurdish and Shia populations.
The UN trade embargo remained in place after the war.
The Security Council laid out strict demands on Iraq for lifting the
sanctions, including destruction of its chemical and biological weapons,
cessation of nuclear weapons programs, and acceptance of international
inspections to ensure that these conditions were met. Iraq resisted these
demands, claiming that its withdrawal from Kuwait was sufficient
compliance.
In June 1993 the United States launched a widely
criticized cruise missile attack against Iraq in retaliation for a
reported assassination plot against former U.S. president George Bush. In
November 1994 Hussein signed a decree formally accepting Kuwait’s
sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity. The decree
effectively ended Iraq’s claim to Kuwait as a province of Iraq.
In 1994 Iraq continued its efforts to crush internal
resistance with an economic embargo of the Kurdish-populated north and a
military campaign against Shia rebels in the southern marshlands. The
Shias were quickly crushed, but the crisis in the Kurdish region, which
had long suffered from internal rivalries, was prolonged. Kurds had often
disputed over land rights, and as their economic and political security
deteriorated in the early 1990s, the conflicts became more extreme. In the
mid-1990s clashes between the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) led to a state of civil war.
In August 1996 leaders of the KDP asked Hussein to
intervene in the war. He sent at least 30,000 troops into the Kurdish
enclave protected by international forces, capturing the PUK stronghold of
Irbil. The international forces decided to leave the enclave rather than
intervene in the dispute between rival Kurdish factions. The KDP was
quickly installed in power. The United States responded to Hussein’s
incursion with two missile strikes against southern Iraq, but the
following month Iraq again helped KDP fighters, this time taking the PUK
stronghold of As Sulaymaniyah. By 1997 the KDP ruled most of northern
Iraq.
In September 1998 the PUK and KDP signed an agreement
calling for the establishment of a joint regional government. Although
implementation of the agreement proceeded more slowly than planned, it
resulted in an end to the fighting between the two groups.
Meanwhile, the economic crisis in Iraq continued to
worsen in 1995 and 1996. Prices were high, food and medicine shortages
were rampant, and the free-market (unofficial) exchange rate for the dinar
was in severe decline. Although the sanctions continued, in April 1995 the
UN Security Council voted unanimously to allow Iraq to sell limited
amounts of oil to meet its urgent humanitarian needs. Iraq initially
rejected the plan but then accepted it in 1996; it began to export oil at
the end of that year. In 1998 the UN increased the amount of oil Iraq was
allowed to sell, but Iraq was unable to take full advantage of this
increase because its production capabilities had deteriorated under the
sanctions.
Hussein’s interference with UN weapons inspectors
nearly brought Iraq into another military crisis in early 1998. However,
UN secretary general Kofi Annan negotiated an agreement that secured
Iraq’s compliance and averted military strikes by the United States and
its allies. In December of that year, in response to reports that Iraq was
continuing to block inspections, the United States and Britain launched a
four-day series of air strikes on Iraqi military and industrial targets.
In response, Iraq declared that it would no longer comply with UN
inspection teams, called for an end to the sanctions, and threatened to
fire on aircraft patrolling the “no-fly zones.” Through 2001, Iraq
continued to challenge the patrols, and British and U.S. planes struck
Iraqi missile launch sites and other targets.
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